</a>
</div>
<div>
<h3>Angola</h3>
<a href="#angola">
</a>
</div>
<p><a href="https://angop.ao/en/noticias/economia/restabelecida-energia-electrica-nas-11-provincias-afectadas-pelo-apagao/"><u>Eleven provinces</u></a> in <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/ao"><u>Angola</u></a> lost electrical power on January 6 <a href="https://x.com/portalangop/status/1876328913070432710"><u>due to</u></a> an interruption in the North and Center Interconnected System, according to the <a href="http://www.rnt.co.ao/"><u>National Electricity Transmission Network (RNT)</u></a>. The widespread power outage disrupted Internet connectivity across the country, leading to a drop in traffic between 14:45 - 22:00 local time (13:45 - 21:00 UTC). <a href="https://angop.ao/en/noticias/economia/restabelecida-energia-electrica-nas-11-provincias-afectadas-pelo-apagao/"><u>Published reports</u></a> said that RNT was investigating the cause of the power outage, but no subsequent information was available confirming a specific cause.</p>
<div>
<h3>Sri Lanka</h3>
<a href="#sri-lanka">
</a>
</div>
<p>Monkey business at the Pandura electrical substation caused an island-wide power outage in <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/lk"><u>Sri Lanka</u></a> on February 9. More seriously, <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/sri-lankan-monkey-causes-nationwide-blackout-2c3cc8ac"><u>a monkey coming into contact with a grid transformer</u></a> caused the power outage, which resulted in a multi-hour disruption to Internet traffic from the country. Traffic initially dropped around 11:30 local time (06:00 UTC), and recovered by around 21:00 local time (15:30 UTC). The graph below for <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/as18001"><u>AS18001 (Dialog)</u></a>, a major Sri Lankan network services provider, illustrates the impact on traffic.</p>
<div>
<h3>Chile</h3>
<a href="#chile">
</a>
</div>
<p>On February 25, a <a href="https://www.clarin.com/mundo/masivo-corte-luz-chile-afecta-80-ciento-pais_0_JxZR7Py3kb.html"><u>massive power outage</u></a> in <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/cl"><u>Chile</u></a> <a href="https://www.cnnchile.com/pais/chile-a-oscuras-mas-de-19-millones-de-clientes-sin-electricidad-equivalente-al-985-del-pais_20250225/"><u>reportedly impacted</u></a> 98.5% of the country. A <a href="https://www.cnnchile.com/pais/autoridades-informan-corte-luz-nacional-debe-desconexion-sistema-transmision-norte-chico_20250225/"><u>published report</u></a> noted that there was an interruption in the power supply from Arica to the Los Lagos region, caused by a disconnection of the 500 kV transmission system in the Norte Chico. The power outage resulted in an immediate and significant drop in Internet traffic, as seen at a country level, as well at a network level, as shown in the graphs below. Traffic initially fell at around 14:15 local time (18:15 UTC) and recovered to expected levels approximately 12 hours later, around 02:00 local time (06:00 UTC). It was <a href="https://www.cnnchile.com/pais/gobierno-informa-mas-94-clientes-pais-ya-tienen-suministro-electrico_20250226/"><u>reported</u></a> that as of an hour after traffic had recovered, approximately 94% of customers had power restored.</p>
<div>
<h3>Honduras</h3>
<a href="#honduras">
</a>
</div>
<p>A ground fault at the 15 de Septiembre electrical substation in <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/sv"><u>El Salvador</u></a> was <a href="https://www.elheraldo.hn/honduras/descartan-honduras-origen-apagon-afecto-region-erick-tejada-KD24633485"><u>reportedly</u></a> the cause of a power outage that resulted in a multi-hour Internet disruption in <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/hn"><u>Honduras</u></a> on March 1. The Regional Operator Entity (OER) <a href="https://www.instagram.com/protocinetico/p/DGrLkEqzWEP/"><u>stated</u></a> that the failure occurred at 09:22 local time (15:22 UTC), which resulted in traffic from the country dropping by about half. The disruption to Internet connectivity was relatively short-lived, as traffic returned to expected levels approximately two hours later.</p>
<div>
<h3>Cuba</h3>
<a href="#cuba">
</a>
</div>
<p>According to an <a href="https://x.com/EnergiaMinasCub/status/1900714003623506167"><u>X post from @EnergiasMinasCub</u></a> (the Cuban state agency responsible for promoting the sustainable development of the country's energy, geological, and mining sectors), at around 20:15 local time on March 14 (00:15 UTC on March 15) “<i>a failure at the Diezmero substation caused a significant loss of generation in the west of #Cuba and with it the failure of the National Electric System, SEN</i>”. This widespread power outage resulted in an immediate drop in request traffic from <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/cu"><u>Cuba</u></a>. Over the following two days, X posts from @EnergiasMinasCub, <a href="https://x.com/OSDE_UNE"><u>@OSDE_UNE</u></a> (the Cuban Electric Union), and <a href="https://x.com/ETECSA_Cuba"><u>@ETECSA_Cuba</u></a> (the Cuban Telecommunications Company) kept impacted subscribers apprised of the status of ongoing repairs. Traffic levels returned to expected levels around 20:00 local time on March 16 (00:00 on March 17 UTC), two full days after the incident began.</p>
<div>
<h3>Panama</h3>
<a href="#panama">
</a>
</div>
<p>An explosion and fire at the La Chorrera Thermoelectric Power Plant in <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/pa"><u>Panama</u></a> caused a <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/blackout-in-panama-after-massive-fire-at-power-plant-water-supply-hit-too/ar-AA1B0vOv"><u>massive power outage</u></a> across the country, starting at 23:40 local time on March 15 (04:40 on March 16 UTC). As expected, traffic dropped immediately, as seen in the HTTP and DNS request graphs below. However, recovery was fairly swift, as the <a href="https://x.com/PanamaAmerica/status/1901288375778246675"><u>electric system saw 75% recovery</u></a> by 03:00 local time (08:00 UTC), with full restoration <a href="https://x.com/Etesatransmite/status/1901234515999174723"><u>completed</u></a> at 06:08 local time (11:08 UTC). Traffic volumes began to increase after power was restored.</p>
<div>
<h2>Severe weather</h2>
<a href="#severe-weather">
</a>
</div>
<div>
<h3>Ireland</h3>
<a href="#ireland">
</a>
</div>
<p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Storm_%C3%89owyn"><u>Storm Éowyn</u></a> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/live/2025/jan/24/storm-eowyn-uk-weather-scotland-ireland-warning-winds-live-updates"><u>wreaked havoc</u></a> on <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/ie"><u>Ireland</u></a> in late January, knocking out <a href="https://transformers-magazine.com/tm-news/180000-without-power-in-ireland/"><u>power and water</u></a>, causing property damage, and limiting air and train travel. The storm’s impacts also disrupted Internet connectivity, as <a href="https://x.com/CloudflareRadar/status/1882851611749626219"><u>we observed</u></a> traffic from Connacht and Ulster fall by 75% as compared to the previous week at 06:30 local time (06:30 UTC) on January 24. As recovery from the storm progressed over the next several days, Internet traffic gradually recovered as well, with traffic in the two provinces reaching levels near those seen the prior week by mid-day on January 28.</p>
<figure>
<img src="https://cf-assets.www.cloudflare.com/zkvhlag99gkb/sXx1CEVuZIP0pDyKXH0xY/2f5d256f5967eca3debcfbe59dc8b42f/GiY1qXQXcAADgKl.jpeg" />
</figure>
<div>
<h3>Réunion</h3>
<a href="#reunion">
</a>
</div>
<p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyclone_Garance"><u>Cyclone Garance</u></a> made landfall over the French territory of <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/re"><u>Réunion</u></a> at ~10:00 local time (06:00 UTC) on February 28. Damage from the storm's 100+ miles/hour (160+ km/hour) winds caused power outages and infrastructure damage, resulting in disruptions to Internet connectivity. The most significant impacts to traffic were observed in the hours after the storm made landfall, but it took <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/explorer?dataSet=netflows&loc=re&dt=2025-02-27_2025-03-05&timeCompare=1"><u>several days before traffic returned to expected levels</u></a>, reaching that point around 08:00 local time (04:00 UTC) on March 4.</p>
<div>
<h2>Earthquake</h2>
<a href="#earthquake">
</a>
</div>
<div>
<h3>Myanmar</h3>
<a href="#myanmar">
</a>
</div>
<p>On March 28 at 12:50 local time (06:20 UTC), a <a href="https://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eventpage/us7000pn9s/executive"><u>magnitude 7.7 earthquake</u></a> shook <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/mm"><u>Myanmar</u></a>, resulting in <a href="https://reccessary.com/en/news/asean-environment/massive-earthquake-in-myanmar-triggers-power-outages-fuel-shortages"><u>power outages and fuel shortages</u></a>. Almost immediately, <a href="https://x.com/CloudflareRadar/status/1905566630760902897"><u>traffic dropped by around 40%</u></a> at a country level. <a href="https://x.com/CloudflareRadar/status/1905603328144261396"><u>Regionally</u></a>, traffic from Nay Pyi Taw dropped 97% as compared to the previous week, Mandalay fell 90%, Ayeyarwady lost 88%, Bago 50%, and Shan State was down 38%.</p><p>While recovery efforts stretch into April, regular traffic patterns and volumes bounced back within days, as seen in the HTTP and DNS request graphs below.</p><p>However, at a network level, recovery has been mixed. Both <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/as134840"><u>AS134840 (MCCL)</u></a> and <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/as136442"><u>AS136442 (Oceanwave)</u></a> saw significant drops in traffic after the earthquake occurred, and traffic remained disrupted on both networks through the end of the first quarter. Peak traffic on MCCL has increased slightly, but nearly two weeks on, remains significantly lower than pre-earthquake levels. Traffic on Oceanwave saw steady growth after the initial disruption, and as of this writing is approaching pre-earthquake peaks. (It is unclear what caused the significant spike in request traffic seen from Oceanwave on April 3-4.) In contrast to these two providers, traffic from <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/as163255"><u>AS163255 (Mytel)</u></a> saw a significantly smaller disruption, and a <a href="https://developingtelecoms.com/telecom-business/humanitarian-communications/18289-mytel-says-connectivity-mostly-restored-after-myanmar-quake-amid-shutdown-fears.html"><u>significantly faster recovery</u></a>, as did traffic from <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/as135300?dateStart=2025-03-27&dateEnd=2025-04-09#traffic-trends"><u>AS135300 (Myanmar Broadband Telecom)</u></a>.</p>
<div>
<h2>Cyberattack</h2>
<a href="#cyberattack">
</a>
</div>
<div>
<h3>Russia</h3>
<a href="#russia">
</a>
</div>
<p>On January 7, <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/ru"><u>Russian</u></a> Internet provider <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/as29329"><u>Nodex (AS29329)</u></a> said in <a href="https://vk.com/wall-7622_825"><u>a post on Russian social media platform VKontakte</u></a> (translated) “<i>Dear Subscribers, our technical staff is still working on restoring the network. The process is painstaking and long. We express our deep gratitude to those who support us in this difficult moment! This is really important for us. Let me remind you that our network was attacked by Ukrainian hackers, which resulted in its complete failure. At the moment, its functioning is being restored. There will be communication. When, is still unknown.</i>” The <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_Cyber_Alliance"><u>Ukrainian Cyber Alliance</u></a>, a community of pro-Ukraine cyber activists formed in 2016, <a href="https://t.me/UCAgroup/38"><u>claimed responsibility for the attack</u></a> in a Telegram post.</p><p>The “complete failure” of the Nodex network is visible in the traffic graph below, where Internet traffic from the network began to drop after 03:00 local time (00:00 UTC) on January 7, reaching zero around 05:30 local time (02:30 UTC). Traffic from the network remained essentially non-existent until around 14:00 local time (11:00 UTC) the next day, recovering fairly quickly after that. Announced IPv4 address space fell by two-thirds at the same time that traffic volume dropped to zero, but recovered at 21:20 local time (18:20 UTC).</p>
<div>
<h2>Fire damage</h2>
<a href="#fire-damage">
</a>
</div>
<div>
<h3>Los Angeles, California</h3>
<a href="#los-angeles-california">
</a>
</div>
<p>Between January 7-9, during the early days of the<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/January_2025_Southern_California_wildfires"><u> 2025 Southern California wildfires</u></a> — which affected the <a href="https://www.fire.ca.gov/incidents/2025/1/7/palisades-fire"><u>Palisades</u></a> and <a href="https://www.fire.ca.gov/incidents/2025/1/7/eaton-fire"><u>Eaton</u></a> areas in Los Angeles — there were clear Internet disruptions in at least 13 Los Angeles neighborhoods. According to Cloudflare’s data, traffic drops of over 50% compared to the previous week were especially noticeable in cities like Pacific Palisades, Altadena, Malibu, Temple City, and Monrovia, among others. In the weeks that followed, traffic remained significantly lower than before the fires, particularly in Pacific Palisades and Altadena, reflecting the devastation in those areas. However, traffic recovery occurred significantly sooner in Malibu, Temple City, and Monrovia, although peak traffic levels remain somewhat below pre-fire levels. </p>
<figure>
<img src="https://cf-assets.www.cloudflare.com/zkvhlag99gkb/36NDkw4HzvLjEb1B2kMtLs/1792de620a5c2fbc5f83947f34b14f2f/BLOG-2800_LA1.png" />
</figure>
<figure>
<img src="https://cf-assets.www.cloudflare.com/zkvhlag99gkb/5xXx4H91hZ4sqwfuBpWde7/0cb0b4d03e6a5f2313dc0d6b7f0412e8/BLOG-2800_LA2.png" />
</figure>
<figure>
<img src="https://cf-assets.www.cloudflare.com/zkvhlag99gkb/6RHkUjU4OreZ6pQ8zBy3rQ/13c5a0f94466e4faa6c9673872111621/BLOG-2800_LA3.png" />
</figure>
<figure>
<img src="https://cf-assets.www.cloudflare.com/zkvhlag99gkb/L9WOAV7BMywf9Q1jquEmh/46d5c2df525cf44384bc9f0ddd93a1c3/BLOG-2800_LA4.png" />
</figure>
<figure>
<img src="https://cf-assets.www.cloudflare.com/zkvhlag99gkb/7pOWHX6sf42uUFxUaWTFUD/b569959b669329aa528d6603f9db7827/BLOG-2800_LA5.png" />
</figure>
<div>
<h3>Haiti</h3>
<a href="#haiti">
</a>
</div>
<p>On January 15, an <a href="https://x.com/jpbrun30/status/1879554628469362857"><u>X post</u></a> from the Director General of <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/as27653"><u>Digicel Haiti (AS27653)</u></a> stated (translated) “<i>Dear customers, last night at 8:30 pm we suffered damage to 2 of our international fiber optic cables caused by a fire in the metropolitan area. At 10:30 am a 3rd outage affected all international services, Internet and Moncash. Our teams are mobilized to resolve the problem as quickly as possible.</i>” These fires ultimately caused two complete Internet outages for Digicel Haiti’s customers, as seen in the graphs below.</p><p>Both traffic and announced IP address space (IPv4 & IPv6) dropped to zero between 20:30 - 21:45 local time on January 14 (01:30 - 02:45 on January 15 UTC) and again between 10:15 - 11:00 local time on January 15 (15:15 - 16:00 UTC).</p>
<div>
<h2>Technical problems</h2>
<a href="#technical-problems">
</a>
</div>
<div>
<h3>Russia</h3>
<a href="#russia">
</a>
</div>
<p>On January 14, multiple <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/ru"><u>Russian</u></a> networks, including <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/as8359"><u>AS8359 (MTS)</u></a>, <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/as12389"><u>AS12389 (Rostelecom)</u></a>, <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/as16345"><u>AS16345 (Beeline)</u></a>, <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/as31133"><u>AS31133 (MegaFon)</u></a>, and <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/as203451"><u>AS203451 (K-telecom)</u></a> all experienced a brief disruption in connectivity. As the traffic graphs below show, Internet traffic from these networks <a href="https://x.com/CloudflareRadar/status/1879196319874740312"><u>dropped by around 80%</u></a> between 14:00 - 14:30 UTC. According to a <a href="https://meduza.io/en/news/2025/01/14/internet-users-in-russia-report-widespread-service-outages"><u>statement</u></a> from <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roskomnadzor"><u>Roskomnadzor</u></a>, “<i>A brief connectivity issue was identified. Network operations were promptly restored.</i>” However, <a href="https://x.com/Liveuamap/status/1879195091874746543"><u>industry observers suggested</u></a> that the cause may have been due to an update to the so-called “Russian firewall” that failed and was quickly rolled back.</p>
<div>
<h3>Georgia</h3>
<a href="#georgia">
</a>
</div>
<p>Subscribers to <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/as16010"><u>Magticom (AS16010)</u></a>, one of the largest Internet providers in <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/ge"><u>Georgia</u></a>, experienced a complete outage on January 27. Request traffic and announced IP address space disappeared at 21:25 local time (17:25 UTC), recovering at 01:55 local time on January 28 (21:55 UTC). A (translated) <a href="https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid03i7LBfz1Rn3YUJAUgzgv8oKK2xTPoozMAzeJnEWxbqPvYkMSUukwYnCGSqJDRcpgl&id=100064447729415"><u>Facebook post from Magticom</u></a> explained that the company’s Internet connectivity comes through “<i>channels from Europe</i>” and that “<i>damage was reported in Turkey, where heavy snowfall and avalanche risks have prevented the partner company’s technical teams from reaching the affected area</i>”. Further, it noted that on the backup channel, “<i>suspicious damage was reported at three points on the Georgian side, in the territory of Adjara…</i>” Magticom’s published start and end times for the outage align with the loss and recovery of traffic and announced IP address space observed in Cloudflare data. </p>
<div>
<h3>France</h3>
<a href="#france">
</a>
</div>
<p>Subscribers of <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/as5410"><u>Bouygues Telecom (AS5410)</u></a> in <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/fr"><u>France</u></a> experienced a brief disruption to their Internet connectivity on March 11. According to a (translated) <a href="https://x.com/bouyguestelecom/status/1899352941942681834"><u>X post from the provider</u></a>, “<i>Following a technical incident between 5 a.m. and 7 a.m. you may have encountered difficulties using your services.</i>” As seen in the request traffic graphs below, a drop in traffic is visible between 05:00 - 06:45 local time (04:00 - 05:45 UTC), aligning with the provider’s stated timeframe. Bouyges Telecom did not provide any subsequent details around the cause of the “technical incident”.</p>
<div>
<h2>Unknown cause</h2>
<a href="#unknown-cause">
</a>
</div>
<div>
<h3>Syria</h3>
<a href="#syria">
</a>
</div>
<p>Major Internet outages and disruptions in <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/sy"><u>Syria</u></a> are generally well documented, such as the cable cuts discussed above. However, on February 3, a multi-hour disruption was observed in the country, but no underlying cause was ever publicly disclosed. Starting approximately 14:00 local time (11:00 UTC), traffic from the country dropped by approximately 80%, along with a ~60% drop in announced IPv4 address space. Both traffic and announced IP address space returned to expected levels around 23:00 local time (20:00 UTC). The outage was confirmed in an <a href="https://x.com/syr_television/status/1886403431583092826"><u>X post from Syrian Television</u></a>.</p>
<div>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<a href="#conclusion">
</a>
</div>
<p>While the single government-directed shutdown last quarter, and the lack of such shutdowns this quarter, is an encouraging trend, we expect that it will be short-lived if countries like Iraq and Syria once again take such measures to prevent cheating on nationwide exams. As always, we encourage governments to recognize the collateral damage of such actions, and suggest that they explore alternative solutions to this problem.</p><p>The Cloudflare Radar team is constantly monitoring for Internet disruptions, sharing our observations on the <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/outage-center"><u>Cloudflare Radar Outage Center</u></a>, via social media, and in posts on <a href="https://blog.cloudflare.com/tag/cloudflare-radar/"><u>blog.cloudflare.com</u></a>. Follow us on social media at <a href="https://twitter.com/CloudflareRadar"><u>@CloudflareRadar</u></a> (X), <a href="https://noc.social/@cloudflareradar"><u>noc.social/@cloudflareradar</u></a> (Mastodon), and <a href="https://bsky.app/profile/radar.cloudflare.com"><u>radar.cloudflare.com</u></a> (Bluesky), or contact us via <a><u>email</u></a>.</p>